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77ns zs a case study of an important innovation in providing 
healthcare for the rural poor: the Yeshasvini Health Insurance 
Scheme for rural farmers and peasants in Karnataka, India. 
Arguably the world's largest health insurance scheme for the 
rural poor, the scheme commenced in 2003. Designed in ways 
that overcome several obstacles to providing health security 
for rural populations, the scheme covered, in its second year, 
about 2.2 million widely dispersed peasant farmers for 
surgical and outpatient care for a low annual premium of 
approximately US$ 2. In this paper, we describe and evaluate 
the scheme in its first year of operation, and explore its 
potential to be a model for the developing world generally. 
This is a case study of the Yeshasvini Health Insurance Scheme intro-duced in Karnataka (a state in India which has Bangalore as its capital) in 
2003. In its first year of operation, the scheme covered 1.6 million rural farm-
ers and peasants dispersed throughout Karnataka State. For a total pre-
mium payment of only Rs 7.50 a month or Rs 90 a year, participants are cov-
ered for all surgical interventions, major or minor, and for outpatient ser-
vices at a network of private hospitals. The maximum coverage provided 
for a participant was Rs 200,000 (in July 2007, US$ 1 = Rs 40.5 approx.; €1 = 
Rs 55.3 approx.). At the end of the first year of operation in June 2004, 
9,039 surgeries had been performed, and 35,814 patients had received 
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outpatient consulting services. A significant proportion of total surgeries 
were classified as "major" (e.g. cardiac surgery) without which the patient 
would not have survived. The Yeshasvini scheme is arguably the world's 
largest health insurance scheme for the rural poor. Given its remarkable 
success in the first year of operation, the increased number of people cov-
ered in its second year (2.2 million)1 and replications and extensions of the 
scheme in other parts of India,2 the scheme is already becoming an impor-
tant model of health insurance for disadvantaged populations within and 
outside of India. 
The aim of this paper is to document and analyse the Yeshasvini case, as 
no prior studies about the scheme have been published.3 The authors spent 
two months in 2005 studying the operation of the scheme, including in-
terviews with participants, hospitals and administrators. As the scheme 
breaks new ground on several different fronts in providing health insur-
ance to large rural populations, we will describe its origins, the process of its 
establishment, the rationale for decisions taken along the way, the major 
problems and drawbacks that need to be addressed for the future, and the 
lessons for transferability to other populations within Karnataka, the rest of 
India and the world. 
Several obstacles stand in the way of providing health insurance to the 
rural poor and informal sectors (van Ginneken, 1999). First, the rural and 
informal-sector populations do not constitute a homogeneous category, so 
it is difficult to organize them. Second, they are geographically dispersed. 
Third, there are no employers or it is difficult to identify employers. Fourth, 
providing health insurance to this section of the population is a daunting 
task, because rural and unorganized workers often need employment, in-
come and social security simultaneously. Hence, the private sector has 
shown little interest in providing coverage for poor and rural populations, 
leaving it to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charitable insti-
tutions to take the lead. 
Our review of several schemes (see Table 1) reveals a variety of problems 
that require solutions if we are to make progress on providing a modicum 
of health security to the world's poor. First, there is the problem of the re-
striction in scope. Most health insurance programmes for the rural poor are 
restricted to people living in a single, small, defined geographic area, or to a 
1. In the third year the number of people subscribed reduced to 1.45 million, partly as a conse-
quence of doubling the premium, as reported in an ILO case study written by Radermacher 
et al., 2005. 
2. The scheme has been introduced in Gujerat and another municipality in Karnataka. 
3. The ILO case study report acknowledges that a previous version of our paper is the first 
study of the scheme, and relies heavily on it (see Radermacher et al., 2005). 
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India: Health security for the rural poor? 
defined population (e.g. members of the Self Employed Women's Associa-
tion, SEWA). The target populations in the schemes we reviewed in Table 1 
were small, ranging from 625 to 29,140 people, consistent with Gumber's 
(2002) more comprehensive evaluation of various schemes. Second, there 
is the restricted-benefits problem, a consequence of low premiums. Most 
schemes focus heavily on primary healthcare (e.g. SEWA) or have strict 
ceilings on hospitalization costs, covering members for minor illnesses but 
not major healthcare interventions or hospital costs (see Table 1). Third, the 
administrative establishment underlying various schemes was generally 
weak, resulting in a variety of problems with regard to claims administra-
tion, escalating costs, poor healthcare quality and inefficient delivery of 
healthcare services. A recent review of 83 NGOs providing health insurance 
schemes for the informal sector suggests that issues of poor design and 
management affect their sustainability (Bennett, Creese and Monasch, 
1998). Finally, most schemes were not able to provide access to large groups 
because they were not accompanied by, or a part of, an effective healthcare 
infrastructure of a network of clinics and hospitals, a necessary condition to 
provide healthcare for large dispersed rural populations. These are not the 
only problems in establishing health insurance for the rural and informal 
sectors, but they are the critical ones. However, despite the lack of adequate 
financing that limits the benefits of health insurance schemes for the rural 
poor, van Ginneken (1999) concludes after reviewing many such schemes 
around the world that contributory (self-financing) schemes are more likely 
to be sustaining as there is substantial evidence that the poor are prepared 
to pay for health insurance if it is available and affordable (Gumber and 
Kulkarni, 2000; Martin, Hulme and Rutherford, 1999). 
The Yeshasvini scheme seems to have successfully overcome several of 
these obstacles, and hence a case study of its operation is highly relevant. 
We discuss below the origins of the scheme and highlight how it has solved 
the four problems listed above. Then we look at some representative data to 
get a "feel" for how the scheme operates in practice. Finally, we examine 
reasons for success and evaluate the potential transferability of this model 
to other populations within India, and across the world. 
The Yeshasvini Health Insurance Scheme 
The scheme originated in the mind of Dr. Devi Shetty, a cardiac surgeon 
who has pioneered the spread of telemedicine as well as low-cost cardiac 
operations in India. After a pilot study commissioned by his hospital4 it 
4. The Narayana Hrudayalaya Hospital in Bangalore. 
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became clear to Dr. Shetty that the only solution to providing sophisticated 
healthcare to the rural poor was to create a really large health insurance 
scheme, where the law of large numbers would overcome the basic financ-
ing problem associated with the small schemes of the past. This was the ba-
sis for the design of the scheme. Below we provide details of how each of the 
critical problems encountered when attempting to introduce health security 
for the poor were addressed by this scheme. 
Solving the restricted-scope problem: 
Mobilizing a large number of rural subscribers 
The first step in solving the restricted-scope problem was to identify the tar-
get population. How does one mobilize a million dispersed rural farmers 
and informal-sector workers in the state of Karnataka (an area of about 
191,791 km2) with a population of 45 million of whom 70 per cent work in 
agriculture? Mobilization implied three major steps, i.e. communicating the 
scheme to the peasant farmers and getting them to subscribe, evolving a 
system to collect their premium payments, and issuing identity cards for 
participants. Rather than establish a separate administrative machinery for 
this purpose, Dr. Shetty looked for existing organizations or institutions 
which connected rural people. And it was important that everyone in that 
organization or institution became Yeshasvini members, otherwise there 
would be "adverse selection" problems, i.e., only sick people would join, 
limiting the subscriber base and potentially bankrupting the scheme. 
The only institutions in Karnataka that connected rural farmers and rural 
peasants were cooperative societies. The cooperative movement has had a 
long history in Karnataka since 1905 and encompasses developmental sec-
tors like textiles, sericulture, animal husbandry, fisheries, sugar, horticul-
tural and agricultural credit, and marketing. Since all cooperatives (cur-
rently over 31,000) are required by law to be registered with the Department 
of Cooperatives, Dr. Shetty initiated discussions with the Principal Secre-
tary of the Department of Cooperatives of Karnataka State. The Principal 
Secretary is assisted by a Registrar of Cooperative Societies, who supervises 
several deputy registrars in various regions. They in turn supervise dis-
trict-level registrars, each of whom is assisted by deputy district registrars. 
Further, other government officials, such as the District Collector (the ad-
ministrative head of each district), the District Health Officer and the Dis-
trict Surgeon could be involved through the Department of Cooperatives. 
Dr. Shetty and his employees travelled around the state educating the 
various stakeholders (particularly deputy district registrars of cooperative 
societies) about the scheme. They also communicated with a large number 
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of individual cooperatives, educating the cooperative secretary about the 
potential benefits of the scheme. The mobilization process envisaged was 
that the secretary of each cooperative society would convince the members 
of the society to join the scheme. 
However, the Department of Cooperatives, in its zeal, also got into the 
mobilization game. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies issued each of 
the deputy district registrars with a target membership to recruit. Those 
deputy district registrars, in turn, issued each cooperative secretary with a 
target for membership. Given this administrative fiat, each cooperative 
society secretary followed his/her own methods of signing up members. In 
some cases, he/she discussed extensively with each individual member and 
convinced them to sign up. In other cases, the secretary arbitrarily signed 
up everybody in the society, using their cooperative dues to fund the initial 
premium payment. In yet other cases, all members with outstanding society 
loans were automatically signed up by the society secretary. These multiple 
approaches resulted in the recruitment of 1.6 million people, spread over 27 
out of Karnataka's 30 districts; districts in South Karnataka were better 
represented in terms of membership. 
There are several unique advantages and disadvantages connected with 
the role played by the Karnataka government through the Department of 
Cooperatives. On the plus side, first, the government facilitated access to 
the cooperative societies. Second, the Department of Cooperatives pro-
vided a vehicle through which the scheme could be popularized and com-
municated to rural farmers, a key reason for the successful mobilization 
(Radermacher et al., 2005). Third, despite the communication effort that fo-
cused on the private self-financed nature of the scheme, since it was popu-
larized by government agencies it came to be known as a "government" 
scheme, obtaining credibility in some quarters. Several people that we in-
terviewed told us that they agreed to join only because it was a government 
scheme. Clearly then, being associated with the government provided the 
scheme with some degree of credibility. 
On the other hand, there were significant negatives to government par-
ticipation. Some subscribers were sceptical regarding the quality of care if it 
were provided by the government. Many rural farmers told us that they dis-
trusted the government's ability to do anything and joined the scheme only 
because they could go to a private hospital to get treatment via a govern-
ment-backed scheme. A major disadvantage associated with government 
participation was the method of mobilization (i.e. administrative fiats and 
targets issued by the Department of Cooperatives) that resulted in the nega-
tion of free choice, thus violating a cardinal principle in the design of volun-
tary insurance schemes. A second major disadvantage was that the Karna-
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taka government insisted on paying a subsidy (a portion of the premium),5 
thus violating a second cardinal principle, i.e. that of self-financing! What is 
clear, however, is that mobilization of large numbers of people would not 
have been possible without government involvement. 
Solving the restricted-benefits problem: 
Designing the self-financing aspects 
Deciding on the best method of financing presented some key challenges, 
given the lack of knowledge of the health status of this population. The only 
known aspect was that poor people were willing to pay for health insurance 
if it was affordable. And research in Gujerat (another Indian state) had sug-
gested that the rural poor would be willing to pay an annual premium in the 
range Rs 75-85. Based on this information, it was decided that the annual 
premium would be fixed at Rs 90 per person. Obviously, a scheme with 
such low premiums would require a large number of participants. And a 
gamble had to be taken regarding how many of them would require life-
saving interventions. For instance, figures from the West indicated that 
1-2 per cent of the population would require major surgeries. On the as-
sumption that this percentage would be lower among this population (an 
assumption without any basis because there was little knowledge about the 
health status of the population), it was arbitrarily decided that at least 1 mil-
lion members would be a "safe" starting point. 
A central tenet of the design was that health insurance programmes for 
the masses had to be large but self-financed. However, given the govern-
ment's interest in subsidizing the scheme, each subscriber paid only Rs 60 
while the government provided Rs 30 per subscriber. Although initially it 
was decided that the government subsidy would end after year one, the 
government subsidy continued until year three.6 
5. There are conflicting opinions with regard to the government's motivation here. Our inter-
views suggest that the government realized the populist potential of a scheme like this and 
wanted some degree of participation. Radermacher et al. (2005) suggest that the scheme asked 
the government to subsidize it (at least in the second year). 
6. And in fact, in the second year, the government did not initially provide a subsidy (partly 
based on the results of the first year, where the scheme turned a profit). On the other hand, as 
the scheme became popular, the number of subscribers increased in the second year to 2.2 mil-
lion, the premium was retained at Rs 60, and the scheme did not turn a profit. Hence, the gov-
ernment stepped in with a flat grant of Rs 3,500,000. In the third year, the scheme doubled the 
premium for each subscriber, i.e. from Rs 60 per person to Rs 120 per person. In the third year 
as well, the government made up the deficit with a flat grant of Rs 5,000,000. While the pre-
mium was increased for adults in the third year, it is still Rs 60 for unmarried children younger 
than 18 years. Thus, the average premium in the third year was expected to be Rs 100 (Rader-
macher et al., 2005). 
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Since about 1.6 million people joined in the first year, it was possible to 
think in expanded terms regarding coverage. Given that poor people could 
not afford to pay for hospitalization for both major and minor illnesses, it 
was decided that all charges associated with any surgical procedure would 
be covered. Thus, a person who needed a heart operation would not be 
asked to pay any charges for the variety of diagnostic tests that are required 
before the operation. In fact, other than transportation, the patient would 
not need to incur any expenses at all. It was also decided (arbitrarily, given 
the lack of knowledge of the health status of the population) that the ceiling 
on treatment would be Rs 200,000 per person, which is the highest ceiling 
provided by any health insurance scheme for rural populations in the 
world. In fact, many of the decisions regarding coverage (ceilings, type of 
operations to be covered), while arbitrary at best, were overly influenced by 
the confidence generated in enrolling in excess of a million people. Inci-
dentally, during the second year (2004/05), 2.2 million members signed up.7 
Surgical procedures covered by the scheme fall into eight categories (ob-
stetrics and gynaecology; gastroenterology; endocrinology; ear, nose and 
throat; eye; orthopaedic; genito-urology; and general surgery: for details 
see Kuruvilla, Liu and Jacob, 2005) and prices are set for each procedure that 
the scheme would reimburse to the hospitals (we will discuss this reim-
bursement process aspect later in the paper). Over 1,700 different opera-
tions are covered. However, there are significant exclusions. Among them 
are implants including valves; mesh grafts; stents, nails, screws and joint 
replacement surgeries; liver transplants; and dental surgeries. The scheme 
does not cover follow-up investigations either (unless it can be proved that 
there was some negligence on the part of the hospital). For a more detailed 
list of exclusions, see Radermacher et al. (2005). 
In addition to coverage for all surgical procedures, the scheme covers 
outpatient consulting at the network of hospitals. Thus, doctors' fees for 
outpatient services are fully covered, while the costs of investigations (diag-
nostics and X-rays) are discounted by 30 per cent. 
We found on average that each rural farmer we interviewed went for out-
patient services about three times a year. In Mandya district, for example, 
the average outpatient consultation fee was Rs 20 a visit. Thus, the cost of 
the subscribers' premium (Rs 60) would easily be recovered with three out-
patient visits alone, apart from having free surgery and related costs. This 
was a significant "selling point" of the scheme. In other words, the law of 
large numbers made it possible for the scheme to cover all surgical costs as 
7. The number of participants dropped to 1.45 million after the premium was doubled (Rader-
macher et al., 2005). 
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well as all outpatient costs, and subsidize the cost of investigations. The 
benefits provided, therefore, are superior to those provided by other 
schemes for the rural poor, although the question remains whether this cov-
erage is still enough: very poor people cannot afford the costs of investiga-
tions such as X-rays, for example (investigations are covered if followed by 
surgery, but not otherwise). 
Solving the access problem: 
Creating a healthcare infrastructure 
through a network of hospitals 
Providing rural farmers with access to hospitals would require the active 
participation of the private sector, given that the government hospital net-
work is, as is often the case elsewhere, inefficiently run and kleptocratic 
and, although it is nominally free, most patients have to pay in order to get 
a modicum of care. More importantly, government hospitals are under-
funded, do not always have the required equipment, and do not attract 
enough doctors (who are usually not interested in working for the low gov-
ernment salaries). And government hospitals do not have a good reputation 
among poor people. 
It was not easy to convince the private hospitals to be part of anew net-
work, however, particularly because they had no means of estimating how 
much additional revenue participating in the network would bring. Never-
theless, given low capacity utilization (the average occupancy rate in Kar-
nataka's hospitals was only 35 per cent and the utilization rate of operating 
theatres was even lower), about 30 hospitals agreed to participate and, once 
the scheme commenced and the number of patients grew, more hospitals 
came on board. By March 2004, when our evaluation commenced, about 
92 hospitals were part of the network, and by June 2004,118 hospitals were 
certified.8 
A formal process was established for evaluating hospitals before they 
could join the network. Essentially, a hospital sends its application to the 
District Collector, the Chief Administrative Officer of the district. The Dis-
trict Collector, the District Cooperative Registrar, the District Health Officer 
and the District Surgeon visit the hospital. They then send a report to Fam-
ily Health Plan Ltd., the scheme's administrator. The district FHPL coordi-
nator visits the hospitals again, to ensure that they have the required infra-
structure and care quality, but also to obtain hospitals' standard rates for 
various surgical interventions. Only hospitals with a specified level of infra-
8. The number of network hospitals increased to 150 in 2005 (Radermacher et al., 2005). 
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structure are allowed to be part of the network. Based on a comprehensive 
survey of rates charged by different hospitals in Karnataka, a rate sheet for 
various operations and treatments was developed. Tariffs for the most com-
monly performed diagnostic tests were also fixed. 
As of March 2004, only district-level hospitals were part of the system. In 
terms of access, rural villagers have to travel a maximum distance of 100 km 
to get surgical care at a private district-level hospital. User data shows that 
the average distance travelled by patients is about 40 km. Now, taluk (below 
district level) hospitals want to join, but they will have to improve their in-
frastructure quite dramatically over the next few years to be eligible. 
Solving the administrative problem: 
Professional administration processes 
and third-party administrators 
The scheme is governed by the Yeshasvini Trust, which is composed of 
11 board members, drawn from the medical community and the Depart-
ment of Cooperatives. The government of India's Insurance Development 
Regulatory Authority (IRDA) mandates that insurance schemes must have 
a Third Party Administrator (TPA), who will handle the schemes and the 
claims process but will not be a part of the organization providing medical 
services. Although the IRDA does not specify such rules for self-financed 
schemes, the trust decided to appoint a well-established private firm — 
FHPL (Family Health Plan Ltd.), a division of Apollo hospital - as the TPA. 
FHPL, with over a decade of experience in administering medical health 
schemes, is the largest health insurance administrator in India. Moreover, 
FHPL is also the first TPA in India to conceptualize, design and implement 
a self-financed scheme. While FHPL devises procedures and systems for 
managing the scheme, a representative of the Yeshasvini Trust sits at FHPL 
offices to provide overall oversight. The total amount of fees paid to FHPL 
for managing the scheme is Rs 5,900,000,9 which translates into roughly 
4 per cent of the total subscriptions to the scheme in the first year of opera-
tion. 
When a doctor at a network hospital determines that a Yeshasvini patient 
requires surgery, that doctor asks FHPL to authorize it. The doctor sends 
FHPL a completed form, together with copies of the patient's ID card and 
society membership card. FHPL's resident doctor makes a decision to au-
9. There seem to be some discrepancies in the amounts paid to FHPL. Our data showed a pay-
ment of Rs 5,900,000 in year one (2003/04), while a later ILO study (Radermacher et al., 2005) 
suggests payments of Rs 7 million in the first year and Rs 4 million in the second and third 
years. 
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thorize the operation at the prescribed fee. This is communicated to the hos-
pital. Thereafter the hospital may proceed with the surgery. This process is 
called "pre-authorization". Once the pre-authorization is issued, the net-
work hospital can proceed with the surgery and then submit the claim to 
FHPL. 
The process is fairly simple. From the patient's point of view, there is 
very little administrative hassle. From the hospital's point of view as well, it 
is relatively efficient, and with the Internet a lot can be done electronically. 
There are some problems, however. For instance, it is possible that a patient 
will shop at different hospitals, so that, for example, three pre-authoriza-
tions may be issued for the same operation. It is also possible that the two 
hospitals that have not done the operation could also send in fictitious 
claims (since they have the pre-authorization). This may not happen often, 
since the FHPL doctor is there to check and may remember having author-
ized a particular operation for a particular person — but a process of can-
celling existing pre-authorizations once a claim is sent in by one hospital is 
still required.10 
Results of the first year of operation 
By the end of the first year of operation, a total of 9,039 surgeries had been 
completed, valued at a total of Rs 105.3 million. However, the actual num-
ber of pre-aufhorizations was higher at 10,214 (valued at Rs 119.4 million). 
The difference between the two numbers occurs because pre-authorizations 
are issued but the surgery does not take place by the end of the fiscal year. 
From an accounting standpoint, the scheme turned a profit. The total pre-
mium paid by 1.6 million subscribers each paying Rs 60 a year, coupled 
with an annual government subsidy of Rs 30, was Rs 144 million. Subtract-
ing the total value of the number of surgeries, which was Rs 119.4 million, 
and the administrative expenses paid to FHPL (Rs 5.9 million), the scheme 
generated a surplus of Rs 18.7 million,11 which was carried forward to the 
second year of operation.12 In addition, the number of free outpatient treat-
ments done at various hospitals was large, a total of 35,814 occasions. 
10. Detailed flowcharts on the process of pre-authorizations and claims are available on 
request from the authors. 
11. This is a rough calculation. There were some additional administrative costs, and addi-
tional income from interest (premiums were banked or invested). After taking these into 
account, a more recent study (Radermacher et al., 2005) calculates a somewhat higher profit, 
i.e. Rs 32.3 million in year one. 
12. Note that in the second and third years, the scheme reported a loss, which was made up via 
the government subsidy. 
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Table 2. Distribution by specialty of cases in the Yeshasvini Health Insurance 
Scheme (July 2003-29 Feb. 2004) 
Cardiac surgery 
Cardiology 
Endocrinology 
Ear, nose and throat 
Gastroenterology 
General surgery 
Urology 
Neurology 
Obstetrics and gynaecology 
Ophthalmology 
Orthopaedics 
Vascular 
Total 
541 
587 
101 
354 
360 
1,741 
595 
23 
1,805 
530 
699 
16 
7,352 
We provide below some representative data on the operation of the 
scheme. These are a snapshot of monthly or weekly activity taken during 
February and March 2004. By March the scheme was into its ninth month of 
operation. Table 2 lists the pattern of surgeries up to the end of February. 
As Table 2 suggests, by the end of February 2004, 7,352 pre-authoriza-
tions for surgery had been given. Hysterectomies (obstetrics and gynaecol-
ogy) accounted for the largest proportion of surgeries (24.5 per cent), closely 
followed by general surgery (23 per cent). Cardiac surgery accounted for 
7.35 per cent, similar to the rates in cardiology, urology and orthopaedics. 
Given what we know about the ability of the rural poor to pay for health-
care, the scheme has been an unqualified success by the sole criterion of hu-
man lives saved. But that is not the only criterion, of course. Analysis of 
districtwide surgery data indicates wide take-up across almost all districts. 
Outpatient statistics for all network hospitals across the state show that, as 
expected, the lead hospitals in major districts (Bangalore, Mysore, Davana-
gere and Belgaum) account for the largest number of cases (for details see 
Kuruvilla, Liu and Jacob, 2005). 
The data also provide some useful information about the nature of inter-
ventions that the rural population needs and the average cost of providing 
this care, both unknown when the scheme was started. The average cost per 
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surgical intervention was Rs 10,955," which was higher than envisaged but 
driven heavily by cardiac surgery (7.5 per cent of all interventions). 
We also conducted detailed case studies of several patients and network 
hospitals. These are available from the authors directly on request (as they 
are too detailed to be reproduced here). In general the picture that emerged 
from these individual case studies was positive, with many patients stating 
that they would not be alive if not for the scheme (although just as many 
told us that they did not even know that they had been signed up for it). The 
evidence from the hospitals was also positive, most of them reporting a sig-
nificant increase in gross revenues as a result of their participation in the 
network. 
Discussion and evaluation 
What have we learned after art examination of the first year of operation of 
the Yeshasvini Health Insurance Scheme in Karnataka? There are a number 
of issues to consider in terms of criteria by which one can judge its success, 
and a number of problems that need to be rectified. 
From the perspective of providing coverage for life-saving operations for 
people who would not otherwise have been able to afford them, the scheme 
is clearly an unqualified success. It covers a significant percentage of the tar-
get population and has the potential to cover more. The rate of coverage is 
also very high (Rs 200,000 per person per year) in comparison with any sim-
ilar schemes for this type of target population anywhere in the world. A 
clear indicator of success is the number of people benefiting in terms of op-
erations and in terms of outpatient care. 
Despite these successes, there is one significant drawback. Although the 
insurance scheme represents a major improvement over all kinds of exist-
ing health security schemes for poor people, it still does not provide com-
prehensive health security. It covers subscribers for outpatient care and all 
expenses connected with surgery, but it does not cover other expenses. The 
things that are not covered (diagnostic tests for non-surgery-related issues, 
and for medicines) continue to be a heavy burden on poor rural families, 
and many of them will continue to cause indebtedness. Given, however, 
that surgeries are generally required in life-threatening situations, the 
scheme provides a degree of health security for this population that was im-
possible before. Whether the scheme can cover in future what is not covered 
now remains an open question. To answer it, we would need better infor-
13. The ILO's study (Radermacher et al., 2005) reports a slightly different figure, Rs 11,650, but 
their calculations were based on a more complete dataset than we had access to. 
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mation regarding the health status of the target population, or at least 
enough data to develop more accurate actuarial assumptions. Continued 
operation of the scheme will provide, in time, better data regarding the 
health status of the population and also better data about the costs. Thus, at 
this point, the scheme breaks new ground in terms of offering surgical and 
outpatient coverage for poor populations to a degree never experienced be-
fore, but it could still possibly be improved. 
There are several issues that raise serious questions about the long-term 
sustainability of the Yeshasvini Health Insurance Scheme. First, although it 
was designed as a self-financed scheme, the government of Karnataka is 
providing a subsidy. We detailed the process through which the govern-
ment got involved, and the advantages of government participation, but we 
see the government's subsidy as threatening sustainability. For long-term 
sustainability, this must continue to be a strictly self-financed scheme. Ac-
cording to Radermacher et al. (2005), the scheme is likely to be financially 
self-sustaining from the fourth year onwards. 
A more crucial problem for sustainability is the fact that not all of the sub-
scribers exercised free choice in joining the scheme. Long-term sustain-
ability requires free and informed choice. Clearly, there needs to be a mas-
sive education effort of the rural population (an extremely difficult job) but 
the government Cooperatives Department also needs to be educated about 
the importance of communication strategies. Simply giving the secretaries 
of cooperatives target enrolment figures is not the solution. Our interviews 
with patients suggest that some of them would not have joined, despite the 
benefits, had they known the financial commitment. On the other hand, 
many learned that they were enrolled only when they went for operations, 
and they were grateful. We did not find any support (based on our inter-
views) for the oft-repeated paternalistic argument that poor farmers and 
peasants do not know what is good for them and do not know how to evalu-
ate such insurance schemes (a justification offered for the lack of free 
choice). Each of the farmers and peasants we interviewed was very clear 
about the costs and benefits of enrolling in the scheme. 
Although we talked with the secretaries of many cooperatives, we are 
unable to estimate the number of people who may not have exercised free 
choice in joining the Yeshasvini scheme during the first year. Of the four pa-
tients in our case studies, two deliberately signed up while two did not 
know that they were members. We also received differing estimates from 
Yeshasvini Trust members as well as FHPL administrators. 
There are some reasons to expect that the lack of free choice may not be as 
big a problem in future years. First, knowledge of the scheme is spreading 
in rural areas through word of mouth from existing patients, and through 
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the network of district hospitals. Second, the Department of Cooperatives 
and the Yeshasvini Trust are both intending to explore new forms of patient 
and subscriber education. Given the surplus in the fund after the first year 
of operation, this issue can and must be addressed. The fact that 2.2 million 
people signed up in year two (for a three-year period) is some evidence that 
the word is getting out. And of this number, at least 1.1 million were repeat 
enrollees. Not all of the increased numbers can be attributed to better com-
munication, education and awareness though, as the Department of Coop-
eratives has been continuing to issue targets for its officers. However, the 
element of free choice is going to be a defining variable in the longer-term 
success of self-financed health insurance schemes for the poor. 
The problem of free choice does not seem to be an issue in two variants 
of the Yeshasvini scheme in other parts of Karnataka. For the past year, 
2006/07, Yeshasvini has been trying to provide health insurance to teachers 
in state schools, informal workers employed by the municipal corporation 
of Bangalore, and the entire rural population of Anekal Taluk. In all of these 
cases, the mobilization of potential subscribers to the scheme is taking a lot 
of time, as they have to go through an education process to convince them 
to join. The progress is thus slow. However, they have been very successful 
in organizing the population in Anekal Taluk. These new extensions over-
come both the issue of free choice and the issue of government involve-
ment that were problems in the scheme which we have discussed in this 
paper. 
A further threat to long-term sustainability stems from the little that is 
known about the health status of the rural population, and the likelihood 
that they will use the scheme. Is the experience in the first year a relevant 
baseline for the number of surgeries that can be expected for subsequent 
years? Relatedly, are there reasons to suspect that the number of users will 
increase as more and more subscribers become aware that they have cover-
age? As we discovered, many subscribers did not know that they were cov-
ered. Would the knowledge that they are propel more of them to seek 
healthcare interventions? It is likely that it will. In which case, the scheme 
may not yield a surplus. Thus, an adequate information base regarding the 
health status of the target population and usage rates must be established. 
This will provide the scheme with some relevant data to make projections 
regarding usage rates, and in the calculation of the premium to be 
charged.14 
14. In this context, it is interesting to note that that in the third year of the scheme (the 2005/06 
cycle), the number of subscribers declined from 2.2 million to 1.45 million. Whether this decline 
was related to the doubling of the premium or whether more people were exercising "free 
choice" is still unknown. 
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The above issues are key to long-term sustainability. We noticed several 
short-run problems as well, many of which were already addressed during 
the second cycle. For instance, a number of administrative problems were 
noticed. These pertain to efficient administration, the design of identity 
cards, and the potential for fraud in pre-authorizations.15 Improvements in 
the day-to-day administration of the scheme, promoting efficiencies in the 
pre-authorization and claims processing, may lead to a reduction of trans-
action costs that could also positively affect the financial structure of the 
scheme. 
A significant short-term problem is the need for education among sub-
scribers about what exactly is covered and what is not. Many hospitals com-
plained about the lack of awareness among subscribers regarding the limits 
of coverage, and many subscribers expected all medical treatment to be 
"free". As Radermacher et al. (2005) note: 
Familiarity with insurance prior to enrolment seems to be virtually non-existent. 
Still many — probably most — insured members are not aware of insurance 
mechanisms and know only a few details about benefits, exclusions and claiming 
procedures. In a household survey conducted by the project "Strengthening 
Micro Health Insurance Units for the Poor in India", 55% of the interviewed 
insured households (N=364) did not even [have] a rough idea what insurance is 
or how it functions (uninsured (N=354)): 71%. 
This is a significant teething problem, but one that can be solved with better 
communication and education. The threats to long-term sustainability iden-
tified earlier are the important issues from a design standpoint. 
Transferability 
Although the scheme is still a "work in progress", it is relevant to ask 
whether there is scope for transferability to other similar populations with-
in India and outside. Answering this question requires an understanding of 
the features that contributed to the successful introduction of the scheme. 
First, the role of the government was important in getting the scheme 
launched. Not all government departments would have been as responsive 
as the Cooperatives Department in Karnataka. In fact, other departments 
within the government were contacted and did not quite respond in the 
same manner. Second, the ability to obtain buy-in from the state govern-
ment and the various private-sector hospitals was clearly related to the rep-
utation of Dr. Devi Shetty, whose credibility is great given his record as a 
cardiac surgeon, philanthropist, educator and telemedicine innovator, and 
15. Radermacher et al. (2005) identified similar problems. 
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for establishing a state-of-the-art general hospital in Karnataka. Without 
leadership from him, this scheme would not have got off the ground. 
Van Ginneken (1999) suggests that dependence on the input and charisma 
of one person or a group of people has been an important factor in the suc-
cess of several health insurance schemes around the world. That seems to be 
true in this case as well. 
A third important feature is the relatively extensive network of hospitals 
in Karnataka. We do not have data (at the moment) on the number and dis-
tribution of hospitals across and within states, so we do not know whether 
Karnataka's network is out of the ordinary. It certainly has a more extensive 
network than West Bengal. Perhaps this was due to the privatization initia-
tives in the education sector that Karnataka has been noted for. Karnataka 
has a large number of private medical and engineering colleges. Since each 
medical college must have a hospital that meets certain standards, this fea-
ture may be the primary factor responsible for the extensive network of pri-
vate hospitals in the state. Although we do not have enough data, some evi-
dence suggests that the number of medical colleges per unit of population is 
higher in Karnataka than in many other states. Thus, a necessary condition 
for the success of schemes like this is the existence or development of a 
healthcare infrastructure. 
Conclusions and implications 
Stepping back, the key story in this model is the law of large numbers being 
effectively used to provide a relatively high degree of health security to the 
poorest populations of the world. This is not a new story, to be sure. The 
most innovative aspect is the success in mobilizing these large numbers 
who are geographically dispersed. The primary drawbacks of the scheme 
are that the self-financing and free-choice principles have not yet been fully 
implemented. The main lesson here is that existing organizations that con-
nect people must be drafted in as a means through which health security 
can be introduced. The transferability of schemes like this depends almost 
entirely on such organizations existing among the target population, and 
the existence of a reasonable healthcare infrastructure. 
The implications are that there are three necessary preconditions for the 
creation of successful self-financed health insurance schemes for large, 
poor, rural and informal sector populations. The first is a system for the 
mobilization of the widely dispersed poor populations, which is the key 
problem. The second is the design of an administrative vehicle or system to 
register subscribers, collect premiums and issue identity cards. And the 
third is the existence of an adequate healthcare delivery infrastructure. The 
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Yeshasvini scheme has creatively solved the first two problems through the 
use of the government Department of Cooperatives, and has found a way 
to network the relatively well developed system of private hospitals in 
Karnataka into an effective machine for healthcare delivery. 
From a public policy perspective, more attention needs to be paid to the 
first two preconditions. Clearly, the question of importance here is whether 
developing nations have the ability to create a "healthcare backbone", i.e., 
just as the Internet served as a key communication "backbone", there need 
to be parallels in the healthcare world to solve the administrative infrastruc-
ture problem. An interesting suggestion in this regard is for India's far-
flung network of post offices to be used as part of this backbone, to register 
subscribers and collect their premiums (although it must be acknowledged 
that post offices in India are not modernized to take on the complex tasks 
of premium collection and issuing of identity cards). It is possible that ad-
dressing the first two preconditions requires diverse approaches in differ-
ent localities. The third precondition, building a healthcare network, is a 
problem that can be solved: given a large enough subscriber base, it is pos-
sible that the healthcare infrastructure can be built. The more challenging 
issues are the first two preconditions, mobilizing a large subscriber base 
and finding ways to enrol them. But the Yeshasvini case demonstrates the 
importance of using the law of large numbers to design an affordable health 
security system for the poor. This is an instance, potentially, where India's 
large population, normally seen as a negative, can be a valuable resource for 
increasing social health. 
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